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To be argued October 29, 1984
ISSUE
The issue presented in this case is a relatively narrow
one: Can the National Labor Relations Board (Board)
properly exclude from the bargaining unit an employee-
relative of the owners/managers of a closely held cor-
poration when that employee does not enjoy any special
work benefits because of that relationship? This ques-
tion is of limited significance to general employer-union
relations as governed by the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).
FACTS
Action Automotive, Inc. (AA) is a closely held cor-
poration owned equally by the three Sabo brothers,
operating automobile parts stores in Michigan. The
mother of the Sabo brothers, Mildred Sabo, and the wife
of one of the brothers, Diane Sabo, are both employed at
AA. Mildred Sabo works as a cashier in one of the retail
stores; Diane Sabo is a ledger clerk at AA's headquarters
office.
During a union representation election held among
AA's employees, both Mildred and Diane Sabo cast bal-
lots. Their eligibility to vote was challenged by the union
based on their close familial relationships with AA's
owners. Although neither woman received any special
job-related benefits or privileges different from those
received by all employees, the board upheld the chal-
lenges to their eligibility based solely on their family
relation.
The union won the election and was certified as the
bargaining representative. AA refused to bargain with
the union, claiming that the board's disqualification of
Mildred and Diane Sabo was erroneous and therefore
the certification of the union was invalid.
The board found AA's refusal to bargain violated the
NLRA, and petitioned the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
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peals to enforce the bargaining order against AA. How-
ever, the court denied enforcement on the grounds that
the board had no authority to exclude employees from a
bargaining unit based solely on the employees' family
relationship to the owners of the business.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Section 9 of the NLRA sets forth the procedures to
be used by the board in handling employee representa-
tion matters, including union elections. A preliminary
issue to be determined by the board in all union election
cases is the scope and composition of the bargaining
unit. This unit determination is important in two re-
spects-it establishes which employees will be allowed to
vote on the issue of union representation, and it defines
the group of employees which will be covered by, and
subject to, the terms of any negatiated collective bar-
gaining agreement should the union win.
The general principle used by the board in making a
unit determination is to group together those employees
who share similar work problems and interests, i.e.,
those employees who have a community of interests.
This community of interests is based on similarities in
employee skills, interests, duties, and working condi-
tions and the nature of the employer's operation. The
Supreme Court has recognized the broad discretion
accorded to the board in making these unit determina-
tions.
In applying this community of interest test, the
board seeks to insure that employees whose interests are
more closely aligned with management than with their
co-employees are excluded from the bargaining unit.
Thus, supervisory, managerial and confidential employ-
ees are routinely excluded from bargaining units. Also,
employee-relatives of management who enjoy special
work privileges because of their family relations are
excluded from bargaining units. These latter exclusions
have been accepted by the courts as appropriate.
In this case, the board seeks to defend its exclusion of
employee-relatives of owner/managers in closely held
corporations, even though they do not enjoy any special
benefits or privileges. The Board says this exclusion is
based on a determination that such employees' interests
are aligned with management by virtue of their close
family relationship. Under these circumstances, the visi-
ble evidence of alignment, i.e., special work privileges, is
not required to prove such alignment. The nature of the
relationship is sufficient proof.
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Moreover, these employee-relatives do not share the
same interest as their fellow employees in gaining access
to management through the device of a union. Em-
ployee-relatives, by definition, already have a direct
pipeline to management by which they can voice their
concerns, a pipeline not available to other employees.
Thus, the board concludes that exclusion of em-
ployee-relatives is necessary in order to protect the
rights of other employees to choose a bargaining repie-
sentative free from undue management influence as
exercised by these employee-relatives, and to protect the
union from infiltration by management-aligned employ-
ees.
AA contends that, in the absence of special privi-
leges, employee-relatives share the same community of
interests as all employees. Assuming such employees'
interests are more closely aligned with management
than with the other employees is unsupported by any
evidence. It is a speculative conclusion at best. There-
fore, excluding these employees from the bargaining
unit deprives them'of their fredom to choose whether
they desire union representation in dealing with, and
improving, their common employee working conditions.
As noted, the outcome of this case is of direct signifi-
cance only in those situations where close relatives of
management in a closely held corporation are employed
as employees. This circumstance arises in a fairly limited
number of cases. Whether this case has any long range
impact depends to a great extent on the manner in
which the Court decides this issue. If the Court uses this
case as an opportunity to discuss and establish general
guidelines to be followed in determining appropriate
bargaining units or to discuss the general authority of
the board in making unit determinations, these prin-
ciples could shape the outcomes of unit determinations
in all contested election cases and affect employer and
union strategies in handling organizational campaigns
among employees. However, considering the fairly nar-
row arguments advanced by the parties before the
Court, it is doubtful whether any wide-ranging pro-
nouncements would be made.
ARGUMENTS
For the NLRB (Counsel of Record, Carber G. Phillips, Assistant
to the Solicitor General, Washington, D.C. 20530: telephone
(202) 633-2217)
1. Section 9(b) gives the board authority to determine
appropriate bargaining units for collective bargain-
ing. The board exercises this authority by grouping
together those employees who share a community of
interests. Employee-relatives' interests are identified
with management, not with co-employees; therefore,
they are properly excluded from the unit.
2. The purpose behind making the appropriate unit
determination is to promote efficient collective bar-
gaining and to protect employee rights to organize
and to choose representation. The exclusion of em-
ployee-relatives serves this purpose.
3. Section 2(3), which defines the term employee for
purposes of the coverage of the NLRA, does not
address the issue of appropriate bargaining unit. It
does not act as a restriction on the board's authority
under section 9(b).
For Action Automotive (Counsel of Record, StewartJ. Katz,
2900 Penobscot Building, Detroit, MI 48226; telephone (313)
965-7610)
1. The community of interest test developed under sec-
tion 9(b) is determined by looking at job-related fac-
tors-not private family relationships. Where
employee-relatives have the same working conditions
as other employees, they share a community of inter-
est with those employees and should be included in
the unit.
2. Excluding employee-relatives based solely on their
family relationship undermines the board's neutrality
in union election matters. The exclusion deprives
employees of freedom of choice based on the belief
that the employees would vote against the union.
3. Section 2(3) specifically excludes certain categories of
employee-relatives from the NLRA's coverage and
therefore from bargaining units. By attempting to
exclude other categories of employee-relatives from
bargaining units, the board is acting contrary to the
congressional intent expressed in section 2(3).
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